Who is guilty? Sociological and Cinematic Reflections of Political Crime in France
The social conflict in France has many dimensions. It is possible to list them as follows:
1. The security and strictness of the laws.
2. Suburbs and ghettoization prevent the formation of a common identity.
3. The lack of vision and polarization of French politics, the rise of the extreme right and the loss of representation of the left.
4. Police support of the extreme right, their training and the inadequacies of the system
5. Problems of the French economy’s loss of productivity and its inability to include immigrants
France has been battling suburban riots since 2005. In 2005, 2 young people aged 16–17 hid in an electrical transformer while fleeing from the police and died by hitting the wires. In 2005, the electrocutions of Zyed Benna, 17, and Bouna Traore, 15, after they hid from police in a power substation in the Paris suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois sparked three weeks of rioting throughout France. The nationwide riots raged through housing projects in troubled neighbourhoods with large minority populations. Although they stemmed from the teens’ deaths, they were fueled by deeper problems of discrimination, unemployment and a sense of alienation from French society (Petrequin, 2023).
The wave of rebellion spread. It took 20 days. Paris, Lyon and Bordeaux burned with the fire of rebellion. A state of emergency was declared for 21 days. After that, after 2005, structural reforms started and more social housing, more human-friendly buildings and living spaces were designed. 60 billion Euros were allocated by the state to increase municipal services, hospital and school facilities. Despite these, a radical break occurred in 2015. On January 7, 2015, the Charlie Hebdo attack took place due to the cartoon crisis. In 2020, due to the cartoon crisis, a teacher named Samuel Paty was beheaded by an 18-year-old student of Chechen origin outside the school in Paris. On top of that, security measures have been increased even more. The police organized protest demonstrations. Although left-wing politician Jean-Luc Mélenchon said to withdraw the law in 2017, the law was not withdrawn. On June 27, 2023, 17-year-old Nahel Merzouk was shot dead by a police officer during traffic control in Nanterre, a suburb of Paris, France.
In the 2000s, Muslims and Romanians were at the centre of the international migrant problem in France. Especially in the formation of xenophobia, the practices of the years when Nicolas Sarkozy was the Minister of Interior in 2005 and the President between 2017–2012 have a very significant importance. During the 2005 riots, Sarkozy said that the events will be approached with a “zero tolerance” approach and that these places will be cleared of these people (Sezginer, 2006). France’s post-2000 immigration policy develops in two axes. The first of these is the selection of immigrants who will be beneficial to the country, and the other is the integration problems of general immigrants. When we look at the new sanctions brought by the immigration law enacted in France in 2011, it focuses on penalties and deportation rules rather than integration (Özer, 2015, p.19–25).
In 2017, a legislative amendment was made and the powers of the French Police were increased and it was given the opportunity to control the social media accounts of citizens with permission to shoot at it. (Jabkhiro and Foroudi, 2023) Researchers Sebastian Roché, Paul le Derff and Simon Varaine, who have produced a statistical analysis linking the increase in the number of deaths to the law, said a similar rise in deaths by shooting didn’t occur in neighbouring countries. They have also questioned the lack of appropriate training for police officers. “There’s a very clear correlation between this change in the law in 2017 and the rise in fatal police shootings,” Roché told Le Nouvel Obs media. “On average, there are 25% more shootings, and five times more lethal shootings. Since 2017, there has been a clear shift in police practices towards an increase in police shootings.” (Petrequin, 2023).
According to AFP, 97% of French police vote for a right-wing party. French police are racist and aggressive. Security and right-wing ideological bias is dominant in the French police. Police unions had defended the right to fire. The strong Nazi connection in Germany shows that security policies are very common in Europe. The French police also have structural problems. Insufficient budget, insufficient education, few personnel, and institutional loneliness are among these. France, for example, is trying to solve problems in a largely security-oriented way. The French state cannot provide adequate and comprehensive education, hospital and rehabilitation services to immigrants living in the suburbs, and in this sense, the French police feel alone in the solution process (Altundağ, 2023, Jacobin, 2022; France24, 2022; Burrows, 2017). For instance, Polisse (2011, Maïwenn) is an influential film about such difficulties in the French police. The French police, who have to deal with a world of problems at the same time, experience the feeling of burnout and loneliness at a high level.
In the movie Damien veut changer le monde (2019, Xavier de Choudens) criticizes the racist laws in France. In the movie, the lead actor Damien is a left-wing Frenchman who has officially agreed to be the father of refugee children, even though it is illegal, in order to help them get a residence permit in France. He criticizes the racist laws in France. But the police finally catch his voluntary but illegal act. While his brother, who is a lawyer, defends his brother Damien in the courtroom, he argues that everyone who receives an education is a French citizen. He draws attention to the compatibility of this with the principle of fraternity and argues that immigrants should benefit from the French education system.
According to a report compiled by Al Jazeera (2023), the UN and EU do not only condemn racism by the police. Similar situations exist in workplaces. According to the French official report “Discriminations et origines : l’urgence d’agir”, in France, real or alleged immigrant background is the second most common criterion for discrimination after sex, and “11% of people have had an immigrant origin or reported that they were exposed to more than one discrimination based on skin colour. The report also mentions that “Men who are descendants of immigrants from North or Sub-Saharan Africa […] have an average monthly salary that is 7% lower than that of men with no migratory ancestry. “It’s even worse when it comes to access to housing: “people with an Arabic- or African-sounding names are 27% and 31% less likely respectively to get a first meeting with the landlord,” according to the same survey. What we see here is a systemic interweaving of economic exploitation and racism. (Muncer, 2023; Red, 2023; Cgt, 2020)
Economic inequalities, which are the result of neoliberalism, come first at the root of the suburban problems. On the other hand, there is the problem of political representation and shrinkage of union activities, ethnic exclusion, constant search by the police, violence and urban congestion (Yılmaz, 2006, p.48; Astier, 2012; Akpamuk, 2023).
The French Communist Party, which has been on a revisionist line since the 1930s, has indirectly denounced the necessarily violent protest movement in the face of strong state repression, calling for “peaceful” demonstrations. Jean-Luc Mélenchon, leader of the left-wing populist party Unyielding France, urged rebellious youth out of anger not to damage schools. These words of the leader of Unyielding France were interpreted as he did not understand at all what was going on in terms of immigrants in the country. As sociologist Pierre Bourdieu once proved in his 1964 book Les hériters (The Heirs), young people from the suburbs in so-called “republican schools” are preparing for a future they will never have. Upward social mobility, access to a permanent job, or even ownership of property is nearly impossible. For this reason, the French education system is conflicted in establishing a social republic. Mélenchon has been criticized for failing to grasp these realities of the suburbs and for praising the French Social Republic. However, it is obvious that Mélenchon, like others, is condemned for being a prisoner of the so-called prosperity period for the French working class between 1945 and 1975. In the face of current events, the “extreme left” — climate activists, feminists, anarchists, Trotskyists, Marxist-Leninists, Maoists, etc. — got stuck in their common comments and attitudes. For this reason, the French political left has difficulty perceiving the real problems of immigrants in the ghettos. (Muncer, 2023).
When you look closely at the suburbs, the features of the houses are also remarkable. Although the block buildings here functioned positively after the Second World War, these large blocks have become the centres of inequalities and isolation as they are outside the city centres. Worker immigrants from the colonies and other countries stay here. The average annual income of the people living here is around 12,000 euros. That is, they are in the low-income class. 5 million people live in these residences. The number of doctors and teachers is very few in the ghettos. 60% of the people living here live below the poverty line. Theft, drugs, snatching and motorbike use are quite common (Altundağ, 2023).
French immigrant cinema and French cinema, which focuses on immigrants, have been discussing suburban issues for years. “La Haine” (Mathieu Kassovitz, 1995), which is one of the films that effectively show the problems of the suburbs, effectively showed the culture of being in-between, not accepting the immigrant and French identity, young people who have no hope for a future in work and education, street French, dressing up and rebellion. 17 years after the production of the film and 30 years after the first riots in the suburbs of France, it is striking that the source of the problem has not changed much. Unemployment, discrimination, resentment, the informal economy, the rise of extremism, anger and violence that have taken over Europe are cited as the cause of the uprisings in the suburbs. (Euronews, 2011)
Today, we do not see many representatives of political movements and parties in the Ghettos. But in the past, in the 1980s and before, the communist and socialist party had close relations with the suburbs, but this was abandoned. The last state of political representation was recognized by the movement against discrimination and exclusion called “SOS rascisme” by those living in the suburbs. After that, the left movements started to break away from the ghettos. We see that the bureaucratization process is accelerating in the left movement. The presence of non-governmental organizations is also very limited in the ghettos. However, the youth of the suburbs are constantly pushing the channels of exit in this closed system, which clearly squeezes themselves into a narrow space. It can be seen as a start that the NUPES (Social and Ecological New People’s Union) movement, led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon, has recently become more interested in the problems in the suburbs. In addition, it can be considered as a light that some suburban youth with high school graduates are interested in the political field and even appear in local governments. However, it is a fact that a large part of the French poor abandoned to the suburbs support the anti-foreigner French nationalists (Poyraz, 2023).
According to Giddens (2012, pp. 402–403), individuals are the product of circumstances as well as sometimes “social exclusion”. Alternative identities emerge in the ghettos and since the feeling of alienation and disconnection is very high, all individuals are affected by it. For example, “People living in a dilapidated housing estate surrounded by bad schools and few job opportunities are effectively deprived of opportunities that create better conditions for them. However, this is not the case for many people in society (…) For example, Banks may refuse to issue a valid bank account or credit cards to individuals living in a particular zip code area.” These situations are examples where social exclusion affects individuals. These examples are quite common in France.
A climate of violence breeds crime, according to an approach called the Broken Glass effect. When the police are more violent and racist, immigrants living in ghettos are generally affected. If one of your friends is killed, it affects the others. Violence breeds violence. Mass psychology. This is how despair spreads. Stories can affect people negatively. The ghetto culture hinders adaptation because its integration with the city is physically hindered. Immigrants mostly live in the suburbs and thus there is social and identity separation. And when the economy and services are inadequate, the problems become more complex. Directed by Malian director Ladj Ly, Les misérables (2019) effectively documents the disproportionate violence of the French police.
According to the French left political view, the integration policies of the French state are problematic and inequalities abound. For this reason, a culture of rebellion prevails in the suburbs. Job, health, culture, education, and nursery services are insufficient, and teachers and doctors are few in number. Immigrants also carry the psychological burden of colonial history. Conditions are bad in this sense. These young people do not feel French because of ghettoization, they do not prefer or dislike their French identity. This is why brutality and looting are common. Although the reason for the anger is not understood, the social inequality of the ghettos is the main reason. The French right-wing political view, on the other hand, is dominated by a security approach. According to those who think about security, immigrants do not follow the rules, they use drugs and resort to violence. They clash with the cops. The real problem is the behavioural disorder and criminal tendencies of these people. However, the French state gives scholarships, opens schools, offers cultural centres and services, but immigrants do not prefer these.
When we look at the historical roots of the conflict, an exclusionary feature of the French national model is noticed. For example, French nationalism, French language, secularism, republicanism, positivist enlightenment, and active citizenship force non-French people to change their identities. The French do not accept alternative immigrant identities. This is why France is having a hard time creating a new social contract. Fundamental extremism, religious orders and madrasas, which have become common among immigrants, adversely affect the social contract. The largest Muslim community, however, is in France. France cannot offer these immigrants a common identity. In order to follow French Islam, Macron imposed a requirement for imams from Turkey to speak French. The aim was to monitor and control the Muslims. French politics is an elitist example in this sense. 4 out of 6 presidents of France are Science Po graduates. The elitist and republican approach is not concerned with the expectations of the immigrant community. France and Germany also had stopped the activities of the Ülkü Ocakları with the decision they took in the past years. They regarded the Ülkü Ocakları as a radical and violent organization.
The revolution in France at the end of the 18th century was one of the important events in the birth of the idea of nationalism. The main purpose of the revolution was to abolish the privileged political rights of the noble and clergy of the society. The Enlightenment movement was another important issue for French nationalism, in that the individuals forming this unity were political subjects and constituted the intellectual source of the idea of nationalism. The society, which was organized within the intellectual motivation revealed by the Enlightenment movement, saw the privileges gained through theological or blood ties as a problem. The existence of a rational person in social life as an individual should have removed the discrimination based on blood ties in the legal context. This intellectual advice of the Enlightenment movement for the individual formed the basis of the concept of the citizen, which formed the consciousness of the French nation (Kökerek, 2002, p.38). Renan’s definition of a nation is open to “everyone willing” to learn the language and history of the society, regardless of ethnicity or colour (Akkaya, 2004, p.71–73).
The common feature of French and English nationalism, which is considered to have a significant impact on the Western world, is the dominance of the interests of the middle class (i.e. the majority) that started to exist in the capitalist and mercantile economy that emerged with the collapse of feudalism as a system in which the absolute monarchical structure was nourished. In this case, the king, who represents the central authority, becomes passive in the face of the people who represent the majority. The existence of such a historical starting point is seen in the development of this understanding of nationalism, which is dominant in England, France, Switzerland and Flanders. Concepts such as civil society, citizenship and the public have been shaped around a common understanding of power brought together by a pluralistic management approach. Therefore, in such a structure, the existence of discrimination regarding minority groups such as sect, ethnic origin, language and sect is also excluded. It is accepted that such distinctions weaken the power of the people against a monarchical power (Emiroğlu and Aydın, 2003, s.591–592).
However, Wenden (1998, pp.41–43) exemplifies the changing character of French nationalism through historical periods. Weden states that citizenship in France was given to those who embraced the values of the revolution during the revolutionary years. However the 1793 constitution made it a little more difficult and introduced a measure of official proof. In 1946, it was seen that Algerian Muslims could not vote in the elections, except for a very small educated minority, until the legal change in 1947 in France, which gave women the right to vote and be elected. This is an indication that some nationalities have not been able to attain citizenship status. With the 1980s, it is seen that the old French citizenship tradition was tried to be revived.
First, in the 2000s, there was a return to strict discriminatory policies. For example, during the World Cup in 2014, the peaceful demonstrations of Algerians, who defeated Russia, on French streets were criticized by the far-right leader Marine Le Pen, and it was emphasized that dual citizenship should be abolished. According to the National Institute of Population Studies, 5% of the French population between the ages of 18–50 has dual citizenship (Özer, 2015, p.34–35). As a matter of fact, the documentary Les Bleus une autre histoire de France (Directors David Dietz, Sonia Dauger, Pascal Blanchard, 2016) shows that French football players with immigrant backgrounds are severely criticized by French politicians, even if they are successful.
French nationality is different from the English liberal type. French nationalism is not suitable for Muslims and is very strict. Today, the headscarf ban still continues. Religious symbols are prohibited in public (Özer, 2015, p.23). Muslims perceive this as an interference with their lifestyle and a kind of assimilation. The reasons why immigrants stay in France despite these difficulties are the economic opportunities of France. Immigrants do not want to leave because of their economic prosperity. But today’s Western Europe and France’s economy is not growing. The Europe of the 1970s no longer exists. Mediterranean-type economy dominates in France: monetary aid. Industrial production shifted to the Far East. France produces luxury consumer goods such as perfumes and is fed by tourism revenues. It cannot produce information technologies like America. The main problem of France is that it cannot have productive economic growth in this sense (Altundağ, 2023).
The Yellow Vests, which started with demonstrations in France on Saturday, November 17, 2018, and consisted of non-immigrant French citizens, were also complaining about the economy. Decreased state aid, tax injustice, more investments in cities, less investment in rural areas and suburbs, economic contraction, and unemployment were the main issues they complained about. This shows that the economy is at the forefront of the problems that the French complain about as much as the immigrants (Koyuncu and Gökkuş, 2023; Altundağ, 2023; Arayıcı, 2018).
In the movie called “At War” (En Guerre, Stéphane Brizé, 2018) the workers are fired even though the factory they work in makes a profit. They cannot make their voices heard by those responsible and state officials by acting in solidarity. The film, which includes a critique of the neoliberal economic order, also criticizes the silence of national governments towards multinational companies. A management approach that sees workers as a cost is insensitive to the economic depression that workers and their families are in. The Yellow Vests are a psychological outward reflection of this situation.
The first immigration agreement between France and Türkiye was made in 1965. In particular, it is aimed to feed the construction and automotive sectors. (Cited from Ali, 2005, Danış and Üstel, 2008, p.4–6) The migration flow was interrupted in 1974 and the flow began to be made more according to certain special needs. The settlements of the first Turkish immigrants were around Paris, Alsace Lorraine and Rhones-Alpes regions. However, due to the contraction in the employment market in 1980, Turks dispersed all over France (Petek Şalom, 1998 as cited in Danış and Üstel, 2008, p.4–6) This contraction in the employment market can be explained by the measures of the globalizing world in terms of foreign investment, cost reduction and increasing the use of technology in the field. According to the data of the Turkish Ministry of Labor, the factors affecting the migration of Turkish immigrants to France are the 1971 memorandum, the 1980 military coup, and the intense conflicts in Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia in the 1990s.
Kaya (2008, pp.38–39) presents the following statistics about the Turks in France. “According to the data obtained in the Euro-Turks study, 30% of French Turks stated that they came to France to work, while approximately 49% of them stated that the main reason for their coming to France was marriage (27%) or family reunification (22%). they have stated. These figures show how different dynamics international migration has and in this sense, it presents a continuity that cannot be prevented.”
Kaya (2008, pp.47–49) reached the following conclusions as a result of observations and interviews held in France. Young people experience differences between street and home life. They have to act like a Frenchman on the street and a Turkish at home. Not being able to enter business and education life brings anger. Young people develop anarchist attitudes that do not belong anywhere. Inability to hold on and future anxiety are at high levels. The expression “you can be a terrorist” in the language of these young people is gaining popularity. While Turkey is hated, France is also hated. The young people who make up the angry society are not only Turks but also Arabs, Africans and French. There is a shared anger. There is a disconnect between the family and the street. The father does not take care of his child because he works day and night. Therefore, he rules the family by pressure. The street is a symbol of freedom. The child oscillates between this oppression and freedom. Both the actual and symbolic existence of violence feeds traumatic behaviours. Even within groups, young people feel lonely and only wish for normalization.
When it comes to 2022, it is seen that the situation has not changed much. Continuing his research in Science Po, Mehmet Yaşar Altundağ (2022) seems to have reached quite interesting results in his research on the younger generation of Turks living in France. Young generation French Turks are different from previous generations. Unlike their parents, they were not born in Turkey, they were born and raised in France. They are going to university. On the other hand, they feel unrepresented in French politics. They think that the isolated Turks do not represent them either. The new generation of French Turks has an intense interest in both French politics and Turkish politics. They do not vote for Jean-Luc Mélenchon, which many Muslims vote for. On the one hand, they deal with the problems of French politics, on the other hand, they personally experience the desire of the French Turks not to integrate in the previous generation. They think that neither the French nor the isolated Turks represent them. They are on the side of the secular state and as a Muslim, they feel the heavy rules on their necks. Against the violence of the Bozkurt; but they think Turks are being treated unfairly. Nationalist sentiments sometimes outweigh. Melanchon’s support of the PKK leads them to the Green Party. For the younger generation of French Turks, going to university means growing up with the values, politics and institutions of France, while staying in the suburbs and in a closed Turkish community brings with it social and political isolation. Although they find Turkishness and Islam important and valuable, they think that the increasing visibility of Muslim women with new generations is one of the reasons for the increasing Islamophobia in France. Previously, headscarved women used to stay at home, but now they are on the streets and everywhere. According to them, “Islam in France is being heavily influenced by all over the world. France doesn’t know how to react to it.” But on the other hand, they also state that they are uncomfortable with France’s funding of religious activities by other countries. For example, France went to Morocco to create its own imams in order to break the Turkish influence among the imams.
As can be seen from these analyses, younger generation Turks think more rationally, make comparisons, follow the media closely, and compare with Turkey, unlike their families and backgrounds. In this case, it can be said that the new generation of young Turks are academic, analytical and professional.
Turkish immigration to France followed a three-stage phase. The first of these is labour migration in the 1960s, the second is the neoliberal-led labour force specific to special needs that continued in the 1980s, and the skilled-educated migration coinciding with the post-modern era with the post-2000 digital revolution.
During the Cold War period, 1945–1990, people adopted either American capitalism or the socialist worldview. From the 1950s to the 1990s, France took part in moderate republicanism during the De Gaulle era and in the socialist bloc under Mitterrand’s political leadership. As stated in Le promeneur du Champ de Mars (Robert Guédiguian, 2005), France became a supporter of American policies during Mitterrand’s final years and after his death. This political climate caused generations to become politicized as well. While the pre-1990 French policies were socialist and in favour of immigrants, in the 1990s the existence of immigrants turned into an identity bargain which was mentioned by Riva Kastoryano and immigrants were perceived as a security threat and came to the fore as an argument in the rent race of the right parties.
The strict nationalist and secular structure in France causes the general outlook to result in segregation and marginalization. As a matter of fact, Entre Les Murs (Laurent Cantet, 2008) shows the strict nationalist attitudes behind these segregation situations within the education system. In the film, school administration and teachers have potential prejudices about African-origin students and the administration does not treat everyone equally. The Turkish student in the class is out of the conflict. This is due to the cultural legacy of the historical conflict between French society and African immigrants from colonial backgrounds.
But after the 2010s, Turkey’s separation from the EU axis and shifting to the Eurasian and Middle East axis, and its conservative-nationalist and Islamist position triggered an approach against the political populism of Turkey in France. This structural change has also affected the young immigrant generation living in France. As a matter of fact, Samim Akgönül’s book “La Turquie « nouvelle » et les Franco-Turcs. une interdépendance complexe” [The “new” Türkiye and the Franco-Turks. a complex interdependence] draws attention to this interaction and tension between France and Turkey (Yégavian, 2020; Akgönül, 2020). The French started to show a more intolerant and strict attitude towards the Turks, and the Turks showed a more conservative reflex conjunctural. As a matter of fact, although young generation immigrants know French culture and language well, they also show that they are committed to Turkish and Islamic values. The film Fatih le Conquérant: Directed (2023) by Onur Yagiz, whom I interviewed, clearly shows this ambivalent situation.
There are various studies on 3rd generation Turkish immigrants in France. For example, it can be said that the third-generation Turks living in France did not assimilate because they did not want to deny their origins, but they adapted very well to French society. According to Sabatier Et Berry’s theory of cultural adaptation, integration orientation is defined by the individual’s desire to preserve the heritage culture and at the same time acquire another culture. When the third-generation Turkish youth living in France were asked whether they lived according to the Turkish culture, all the participants stated that they tried to live according to the Turkish culture. Most of them stated that Turkish culture is a naturally developed way of life for them because they were brought up with this culture in the family environment from the day they were born. Although Turkish youth are under the influence of two cultures, they do not allow French culture to overtake Turkish culture (Akdoğan Öztürk, S. & Yücelsin Taş, Y. T. (2018). In another study, it is seen that the majority of Turkish immigrants do not read books in French. 17 out of 19 young people stated that they did not read a book in French; states that they only read daily newspaper news on social media. These young people, like their ancestors, did not immigrate from another country to France. Since they were born and raised in France and embarked on school and business life in this country, they have not been exposed to any integration process. However, the number of French Turks emphasizing their ethnic identity while describing themselves is very close to the number of those who call themselves dual identity. Here, all participants emphasize their Turkishness in their personal descriptions and highlight their Turkish identity (Candemir Özkan, C.; Saraç, F; Akıncı, M. A. 2022). Turks in France show a reflex to protect their ethnic identity, although less than other minorities. This is closely related to the dominant character of French nationalism.
On the other hand, in the 1990s, the 2nd generation of Turks and 3rd generation children of Africans were finishing secondary school under difficult conditions, and many of them went into business before starting their high school education. It was not so easy for young people of foreign origin who faced discrimination to find a job. At that time, the journeys of Turkish immigrants and African immigrants to the future in France would not be the same. The Turks, who have the empire and state tradition behind them, have a strong national identity and cultural values, a strong family structure, and being more enterprising and hardworking in business, causing them to leave the suburbs and ghettos they settled in earlier. Today, a significant part of Turks are their own bosses and live in their own houses outside the ghettos (Taşdelen, A.R. 2023). As a matter of fact, the presence of Turkish investments in France between 2002–2014 reached 134 million Euros. This figure is increasing (Çapanoğlu and Servantie, 2015).
Evrim Kuran’s summary table (2019, p.5), which examines the cultural characteristics of generations in her book titled Generation Z, shows that historical and technological conditions affect people’s worldviews and behaviours. According to this table, 1927–1945 was the Silent Generation and struggled with war and economic depression. The generation between 1946–64 became known for its anti-war, human rights struggle and communicated with the radio. The 1965–79 period came to the fore with the oil crisis, the neoliberal economic model, and the effects of the 68 generation and cinema. The new wave movement in France likened cinema to a firearm. 1980–1999 was called Generation Y. September 11 came to the fore with global warming and the internet. The period after 2000 was called the Z generation. The core values of this era were global terrorism, cloud technologies and bitcoin.
France effectively uses cloud and information technologies within the scope of media literacy and film pedagogy. For example, Cinéphilies, sériphilies 2.0 project, which is among the important projects of IRCAV, aims to systematize the evaluations with question-answer-criticism-comment features that are scattered in today’s social media environments. On the site within the scope of the project, there are some analysis examples that try to show how the audience can ask the right questions about television series and movies and interpret these contents. One of the applications of the Cinephile project is the VOD (Watch as needed) website called Lasinetek. The feature of this site is that it contains movie lists prepared by famous directors. These directors are world-renowned directors and they prepare lists of films they recommend watching by voting on films other than their own. On the other hand, l’Institut Lumière proposes a program called “Mate ton écran”. This education program aims to train the younger generations to exercise their critical eye on information in images, photographic video or cinematographics, in films, television or on the Internet via social networks. Because the image always seems to be true, even when it is not, the device is therefore designed to bring students to a real reflection on the meaning of the image through a concrete realization.
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